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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals an order granting summary judgment on
behalf of defendants Bank One, Utah, N A . formerly known as Valley Bank & Trust Co.
and Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB, allegedly doing business as Willowcreek
Plaza, Willowcreek Shopping Village, Ltd., and Willowcreek Plaza Executive Offices.
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered the order on April 8, 1998.
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j) by virtue of the Utah Supreme Court's transfer of plaintiff's appeal
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal on May 7, 1998 in the trial court and subsequently submitted a Statement of
Issues on Appeal on May 18, 1998, and a docketing statement on May 28, 1998.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Is a complaint which is timely filed but which names as the only defendant
a non-entity not capable of being sued eligible for refiling pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 when it is dismissed without prejudice after the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations?

2.

If § 78-12-40 does apply, does it allow plaintiff only one refiling or may she
continually avoid the statute of limitations by filing successive complaints
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so long as each refiling occurs within one year of the most recent
dismissal?
3.

Regardless of the number of refilings plaintiff is allowed, may she name
new parties not named in the original complaint after the statue of
limitations has run, and do those efforts relate back to the original
complaint thereby avoiding the expired four-year statute of limitations
governing her claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was treated by the trial court as a
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment since matters outside the pleadings were
considered.
The trial court's ruling granting summary judgment on behalf of defendants is
subject to review for correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11 th Avenue Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the trial court's legal determinations are
given no deference and the grant of a summary judgment and the affirmance of such
on appeal is appropriate only where there exists no genuine issues of material fact
relevant to the disposition of the claims underlying the motion. L & A Drywall. Inc. v.
Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980).

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), otherwise known as the savings statute, is
the determinative statutory provision presented for review. It states as follows:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon
the merits, and the time limited whether by law or contract
for commencement the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action within one
year after the reversal or failure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 23, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court alleging
that on December 31,1988 she was injured in a slip and fall that occurred on premises
owned by defendants. (R. 1-2) This was not plaintiffs first attempt to pursue litigation
over this incident. In fact, plaintiff had filed three previous complaints, all in Third
District Court, each seeking relief for her alleged injuries stemming from the December
31, 1988 incident. (R. 2-5) Only the first complaint was timely filed within the
applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries which is four years. (R. 2, 53-62)
However, each of the first three complaints were dismissed without prejudice.
The first two were dismissed pursuant to motions filed by parties not named in the
actions but who were served with process. In the first and second actions plaintiff
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," which in reality is merely the name
on the building where plaintiffs slip and fall occurred. The third complaint was
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voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. (R. 5, 15) When plaintiff filed her fourth complaint
naming new defendants not named in the original complaint, defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint. (R. 12) Defendant's motion argued that plaintiff was only
entitled to refile her complaint once under Utah's savings statute found at Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) and that even if she was entitled to multiple refilings, she could
not name new parties who were not named in the original complaint or who did not
have an identity of interest with the original defendant. (R. 15-20).
The Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted defendants' motion. Since he
considered matters outside the pleadings, defendant's motion to dismiss was treated as
a motion for summary judgment. (R. 92/32 & 83) The order granting summary
judgment was signed on April 8, 1998. (R. 82)
It is from this order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint that she now appeals,
having filed a notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. (R. 85)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was injured in a slip and fall that
occurred on the premises of a business complex known as "Willowcreek
Plaza" on December 31, 1988.

2.

(R. 2)

On or about November 20, 1992, nearly four years after the incident and
only 38 days short of the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation set
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1953), plaintiff filed a complaint in
the Third District Court. (R. 3, 53)
4

3.

This first of four complaints named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek
Plaza." (R. 3)

4.

Plaintiff served her first complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, the owner
of the premises at the time the complaint was filed. (R. 15) See, also
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996), a
copy of which is included as part of the record on appeal. (R. 71)

5.

However, Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, did not own the property at the time of
the alleged incident and instead had purchased it from an interim owner
who had purchased it, Valley Bank and Dime Savings Bank who jointly
owned the premises at the time of plaintiffs slip and fall. (R. 72-73)

6.

Willowcreek Plaza L.C filed a motion to dismiss shortly thereafter arguing
that it did not own the building at the time of the incident and that the
named defendant "Willowcreek Plaza" was merely the name on the
building and did not exist as an entity that could sue or be sued. (R. 3,
15,72-73)

7.

The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis granted the motion to dismiss that in
fact "Willowcreek Plaza" did not have the capacity to be sued and that
Willowcreek Plaza L.C. did not own the premises at the time of the
incident. (See certified copies of Judge Lewis' ruling and order attached
as Exhibit A to the addendum of defendant's brief herein.)

8.

The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint without prejudice was
5

signed on September 22, 1993, over nine months after the statute of
limitations expired. (R. 3-4; see also. Exhibit A of addendum)
9.

Plaintiff then filed her second complaint on September 17, 1993 and again
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 4 & 56)

10.

However, this time plaintiff served Valley Bank. (R. 4 & 15)

11.

Because they were not named as parties, Valley Bank and Dime Savings
moved to dismiss on the grounds that they were not doing business as
"Willowcreek Plaza." Id.

12.

Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that the banks were in fact doing
business as "Willowcreek Plaza" pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (R. 73)

13.

The Honorable Judge John A. Rokich ruled that the banks were indeed
not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and as such plaintiff could not
bring suit against them in that name. (R. 4) He therefore dismissed
plaintiffs second complaint without prejudice. IdL

14.

The order dismissing this second lawsuit without prejudice was entered on
January 17, 1994. JJL

15.

Plaintiff then filed her third complaint on January 6,1994, this time naming
Valley Bank and Dime Bank. (R. 5, 59)

16.

Plaintiff never pursued this action and instead chose to pursue an appeal
of Judge Rokich's decision dismissing the second complaint. (R. 5)
6

17.

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her third complaint on February 22, 1994.
(See, certified copy of plaintiffs Notice of Dismissal attached as Exhibit B
to the addendum of defendant's brief herein.)

18.

Plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal of her second complaint was
unsuccessful on two separate occasions.

19.

Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing
that Valley Bank was not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and
therefore could not be sued in that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also (R. 63-65)

20.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted.
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).

21.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling. Hebertson
v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); see also (R. 71-74)

22.

Plaintiff thereafter filed her fourth complaint on May 23, 1997. (R. 1 -7)

23.

Defendants again moved to dismiss plaintiffs fourth complaint arguing
that the savings statute allows only one refiling and that the statute of
limitations therefore barred plaintiffs fourth complaint. (R. 12-20)

24.

Defendants further argued that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than
one refiling she could not add or name new parties not named in her first
complaint, id,

25.

In opposition, plaintiff argued that the Utah savings statute allows for more
7

than one refiling and that regardless of how she referred to defendants in
her various complaints, her cause of action had always been the same.
(R. 23-33)
26.

Plaintiff also argued that the banks were doing business as "Willowcreek
Plaza" and that her efforts in substituting the banks' names as the
designated defendants in her fourth complaint did not impair her right to
rely on the savings statute. (R. 29)

27.

Plaintiff also informed the trial court in her written opposition to
defendants' motion to dismiss that she had initiated a legal malpractice
lawsuit against her original attorney in the Third District Court styled
Hebertson v. Dalby et. aL Civil No. 960908024, filed November 20, 1996,
the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. (R. 27)

28.

After reading the briefs and listening to the oral argument of the parties,
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson granted defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs complaint on March 13, 1998. (R. 92/32)

29.

Because matters outside the pleadings were considered, the trial court
treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ruled that
plaintiff was entitled to only one refiling after her first complaint was
dismissed. (R. 83)

30.

The trial court further ruled that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than
one refiling, she could not name new parties after the expiration of the
8

statute of limitations. (R. 83)
31.

The order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint was entered on April 8,
1998 and plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. id,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs first complaint which was timely filed was a complete nullity for it
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," the name of the building where
plaintiff alleges her injuries were sustained. "Willowcreek Plaza" is a non-entity. It was
not a business, a dba, or the common name of the actual owners of the premises. As
such, "Willowcreek Plaza" could not sue or be sued. Therefore, the dismissal of
plaintiffs first complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations did not trigger
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 otherwise known as Utah's savings
statute which allows suits not dismissed upon the merits to be refiled after the
intervening statute of limitations has expired.
Put in other words, a suit which names a non-existent defendant who cannot be
sued and thereafter serves the complaint on an entity that has nothing to do with
plaintiffs claims is a complete nullity as if it were never filed in the first place. Thus,
when the statute of limitations expired, plaintiff had not timely initiated a lawsuit against
defendants and the statute of limitations bars all subsequent efforts on her part to sue
the proper parties.
Even if plaintiff was entitled to refile her complaint under the savings statute, she
is entitled to do so only once pursuant to the clear language of § 78-12-40. The Utah
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Court of Appeals in the case of Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813
P.2d 1216, 1221 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) has already indicated, albeit in dicta, that
the savings statute allows for only one filing. Such is consistent with the clear majority
of jurisdictions who have addressed the issue to date. Thus, when plaintiffs second
lawsuit was dismissed, and that ruling was upheld on appeal by both the Utah Court of
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations
from filing subsequent complaints. To rule otherwise and allow multiple successive
refilings so long as each is brought within one year of the last dismissal would defeat
the purpose and intent of statutes of limitation and could result in endless litigation.
Finally, even if Utah's savings statute allows for more than one refiling, Utah law
is clear that new parties may not be added or joined in subsequent filings after the
expiration of the statute of limitations unless it can be shown that the causes of action
are the same and the parties are either the same or bear a substantial identity of
interest with the original parties. Here, plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that
defendants were doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" nor was she able to establish
an identity of interest between a non-entity ("Willowcreek Plaza") and defendants who
were the actual owners of the property at the time. This much has been confirmed by
the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, both of which have issued
opinions addressing plaintiffs Rule 17(d) arguments following the dismissal of plaintiffs
second complaint. Plaintiffs efforts to join defendants as parties in the second and
third refilings of her original complaint are therefore improper and cannot stand in light
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of the expired statute of limitations.
In short, plaintiff sued a non-entity and served the wrong owner of the building
when she initiated her first lawsuit. She has now filed a total of four lawsuits and each
has been dismissed. Her procedural efforts have been scrutinized by three trial court
judges and by both appellate courts of this state in an appeal, a petition for writ of
certiorari, and the Supreme Court's review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff's legal and equitable arguments if accepted would eviscerate the statute of
limitations and leave all potential defendants no end in sight to the litigation possibilities.
Defendant therefore requests that the trial court's ruling be affirmed
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Plaintiff's first complaint naming a non-existent defendant
is a complete nullity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 therefore
does not apply and Plaintiff's three subsequent refillings
are barred by the statute of limitations
Plaintiffs first complaint was filed on November 24, 1992, just 38 days prior to
the four-year statute of limitations deadline for filing litigation with respect to the slip and
fall she claims occurred on December 31, 1988. (R. 14-15) That complaint named as
the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 15) Because Willowcreek Plaza was a
non-entity and was incapable of suing or being sued, plaintiffs first complaint was
dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the new owners of the building who

11

had been served with process.1
The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint was issued in September of 1993,
well over nine months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Because
that complaint never named the appropriate defendant and in fact named a defendant
that did not exist, the savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953) cannot
operate to preserve a claim against a party who was never named, served, or joined as
a party to the original action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation.
The case of Estate of Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
demonstrates this principle in action. In Haro. the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal of a wrongful death lawsuit due to the would-be claimant's failure to name a
plaintiff that had the capacity to sue on behalf of the heirs of the deceased. Plaintiffs
had sued in the name of the "Estate of Martin Haro." id. They filed their complaint six
weeks before the statute of limitations ran. \±
The defendants in Haro thereafter filed a motion to dismiss after the statute of
limitations had run arguing that plaintiff had brought the suit in the name of an entity
that did not have the capacity to sue. Plaintiffs moved to substitute the proper party
pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the
motion to substitute and dismissed the suit, ruling that plaintiffs had not initiated suit

1

It goes without saying that even if plaintiff had named Willowcreek Plaza, L.C.
in the first action the complaint would have been dismissed anyway because they did
not own the property at the time of plaintiffs accident.
12

within the two year statute of limitations, h i The Haro court held that since the suit
was brought by a party that lacked the capacity to bring the claim the lawsuit was "a
nullity" and therefore there was no suit or "cause of action in which to substitute
parties." \± at 879. Thus, even though the original suit was timely filed, the error in
naming the proper party effectively wiped that suit clean from the books resulting in the
expiration of the statute of limitations which barred further refilings. \_± at 879, n. 2.
Dunn v. Kelly. 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), is also on point. In Dunn, the original
plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death lawsuit over the death of a purported relative.
When it was determined that the plaintiff in the original action was in fact not related to
the decedent, the case was dismissed without prejudice.2 \± Thereafter, a new second
action was commenced, this time naming as plaintiffs the proper heirs. However, the
second action was clearly filed after the two year statute of limitations had run. i d at
572. The trial court dismissed the second complaint holding that the statute of
limitations barred the second action and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The parties
in the first action were not the same as those named in the second action and § 78-1240 therefore did not apply and could not be used to resurrect their claims. Jd,
The Haro and Dunn decisions are consistent with case law from other
jurisdictions who have addressed this issue from the perspective of a wrongly named
defendant. In McCoy Enterprises v. Vaughn. 268 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. App. 1980), the

2

As in this case, the original suit in Dunn was dismissed well after the statute of
limitations for wrongful death claims expired. \_± at p. 571-72
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Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court ruling that allowed the plaintiffs to file a
second lawsuit under Georgia's savings statute after the statute of limitations had run
and the first timely action had been dismissed. The first suit incorrectly named the
officers of the corporation as the defendants rather than the corporation itself. JdL at
765. In so ruling, the court discussed plaintiffs ineligibility for refilling under the savings
statute.
If the cause of action is the same in both cases; if by the
same party or his legal representative, and against a person
from whom relief was prayed in the first suit, the second
action may be renewed. Since appellant corporation was
never a party to the original suit, appellee cannot maintain a
"renewal" action against it in light of the intervening statute
of limitation.
Id. (citations omitted)
Similarly, in Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass.
1929), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that actions which fail because they
were brought against the wrong party are not eligible for the savings statute, id, at 654.
In, D a w . NLOInc- 798 F.Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992), the U.S. District Court
for Ohio, ruled that even though the causes of action were the same, plaintiffs efforts to
name different defendants in the second lawsuit rendered the Ohio savings statute
inapplicable and the statute of limitations barred the second complaint. kL at 1328
(citing Heilprin v. Ohio State University Hospitals. 508 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1986).
The same result was reached in Brown v. Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1.
926 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1981). In Brown, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
14

Oklahoma's savings statute and held that the plaintiffs efforts to name new defendants
in a second action who were not named in the first action was improper and the savings
statute, while applicable to the second action generally, did not apply to causes of
action raised against new parties. The second lawsuit was therefore dismissed as
untimely insofar as to the new defendants the statute of limitations had run. \± See
also. Goldsmith v. Learjet. Inc.. 90 F.3d 1490 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the Kansas
savings statute).
In Bavel v. Cavaness. 299 N.E.2d 435 (III. App. Ct. 1973), an Illinois appellate
court held that the original suit which was otherwise timely filed but which named as a
defendant a party that did not legally exist and could not be sued, was a "complete
nullity" and the plaintiffs second or refilled suit naming the proper defendant was
therefore not eligible for the Illinois savings statute and was properly barred by the
statute of limitations. \± at 438. The ruling of the Bavel court is worth noting here.
A case which was legally never in existence cannot be
dismissed or nonsuited for it was a nullity from its inception
and incapable of legally being acted upon. Here, . . . where
there was no defendant there was no action capable of
being heard on the merits. Failure to name a defendant is
not a mere technicality in procedure or form but
constitutes rather a total absence of a cause of action.
The [savings] statute referring to a "new" action presupposes an old or prior action filed within the original
limitation period and here, as a matter of law, there was no
such prior action. It is therefore evident that plaintiffs did not
commence a "new" action when they filed the complaint now
before us, but
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rather commenced the only action, which action was filed
well beyond the limitation period allowed.
Id. at 438. Allowing plaintiffs arguments here would eviscerate the statute of
limitations.
Even though plaintiff has not arg ed that Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows amendments to the pleadings to relate back to the original
complaint, applies to her situation, case law interpreting Rule 15(c) is illustrative of this
point.
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not apply to an
amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those
brought before the court by the original pleadings-whether
plaintiff or defendant. This [is] for the reason that such
would amount to the assertion of a new cause of action, and
if such were allowed to relate back to the filing of the
complaint, the purpose of a statute of limitation would be
defeated.
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984)(citing DoxeyLavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (1976)).
Plaintiffs efforts to properly name and serve defendants here are untimely and
improper. Plaintiff may not renew an action under the savings statute that never
existed in the first place. She cannot now sue the proper defendants having failed to
name, serve, or join them as defendants in the initial action prior to the running of the
statute of limitations. Plaintiffs naming of a defendant who did not exist, and was not a
legal entity capable of suing or being sued, rendered that initial action a complete
nullity. The statute of limitations bars her efforts to now correct that error.
16

POINT II
Even if the savings statute applies, plaintiff is only
entitled to one re-filing of her complaint, not four.
As indicated in the procedural history, this appeal is from plaintiffs fourth
complaint. Therefore, even if §78-12-40 were applicable and plaintiff was entitled to
refile her complaint after the first one was dismissed, the savings statute only allows for
one refiling, not three.
Utah's savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon
the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action within one
year after the reversal or failure.
Id. Perusal of this language indicates that the intent of the statue is to allow one
refiling, not three as plaintiff has done here.
While this question has not buen directly addressed by Utah appellate courts,
this Court in dicta has indicated that plaintiff is only entitled to one refiling. Specifically,
in Meadow Fresh Farms. 813 P.2d 1216, the Honorable Judge Judith Billings writing for
a unanimous panel stated in a footnote that §78-12-40 allowed for only one re-filing.
Although we refrain from addressing the merits of whether
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits unlimited successive
dismissals and refilings, we note that many of the courts that
have been faced with a similar question have concluded that
in the interest of finality and judicial economy, a plaintiff is
17

entitled to only one refiling pursuant to a savings statute.
See e ^ , Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843, 844 (8th Cir. 1926);
Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets. Inc.. 11 Conn.App.
156, 55 A.2d 1389, 1391 (1987), cert denied. 204 Conn.
809, 528 A.2d 1155 (1987); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 152
lll.App.3rd 962, 105 III.Dec. 902, 903, 505 N.E.2d 28,29
(1987); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 175 Okla.
475, 53 P.2d 284, 288 (1935). This conclusion is consistent
with the language of the Utah saving statute as the statute
speaks in terms of a singular rather than multiple dismissals:
"a new action," "the reversal or failure".
i d at 1221, n.10 (emphasis in original). Here, the trial coui specifically found this
footnote, albeit dicta, to be much more persuasive than contrary holdings from other
states. (R. 92/30)3
Plaintiff has cited in her brief to le cases of Roberts v. General Motors Corp..
673 A.2d 779 (N.H. 1996), and Trull v. Seaboard Air Line R.Y. Co.. 66 S.E. 586 (N.C.
1909), in support of her argument that she is entitled to an unlimited number of refilings
so long as each new action is brought within one year of the previous dismissal.
Roberts4 and Trull cannot be distinguished or reconciled with contrary holdings from
other states and the Meadow Fresh dicta. However, the logic underpinning both
decisions is irrational and emasculates the principles behind statutes of limitation. They

3

At the hearing, Judge Hanson stated the following with respect to Meadow
Fresh. "Dicta from Judge Billings is much more persuasive than the holding from some
out-of-state court. It's particularly persuasive when I think she's right." (R. 121)
4

The Roberts court was not unanimous in its decision. Instead, one justice
issued a well reasoned dissent addressing concerns of endless litigation and
harmonizing the savings statute with the applicable statute of limitations, id.
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also represent the clear minority when compared to jurisdictions who allow for only one
refilling.
The following decisions hold that only one refilling is allowed under a savings
statute. Morrow v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Rv. Co.. 66 S.E. 186 (S.C. 1909)(interpreting
South Carolina law); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swvden. 475, P.2d 284, 288
(1935)(interpreting Oklahoma law); Turnery. N.C. & St. L. Railway. 285 S.W.2d 122
(Tenn. 1955)(interpreting Tennessee law); Worlev v. Pierce. 440 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App.
1994)(interpreting Georgia law); Rogozinski v. American Food Service Equip.. 643 A.2d
300 (Conn. App. 1994)(interpreting Connecticut law); Cadvv. Harlan. 442 S.W.2d 517
(Mo. 1969)(interpreting Missouri law); Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1926)(interpreting Arkansas law); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 505 N.E.2d 28 (III. App., 4
Dist. 1987)(interpreting Illinois law); Bush v. Cole. 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio 1912)
(interpreting Ohio law).
Language from the Swyden opinion addresses the philosophical underpinnings
of this majority position which allows only on refilling, not multiple refilings.
We must remember that the grace period is not a release of
the original limitation, nor even an extension thereof for all
purposes, but is only a conditional, limited extension granted
plaintiff because the suit which he did file in time, consumed
some time in court before dismissal, carrying him beyond the
original limitation date, possibly without any fault of his own.
That he could file and dismiss as often as he desired within
the original period of limitation has nothing to do with it, for
at that time there was no bar at all. Once, however, he
passes the bar he is on the law's own time, and is permitted
to ignore the statute only by virtue of legislative exception
19

especially created for the occasion. Thus, good reason
appears to support the general rule and interpretation of
such statutes, to the effect that the legislatures of the
various states, in extending litigants the privilege of filing
actions out of time, mean just what they express by the
words "commence a new action,"and that they do not
thereby intend that plaintiffs may file as many new actions
as they desire, all within the year. Had that been their
intention, then such statutes would have been worded in the
language of the ordinary statutes of limitation, with minor
changes. To give such an interpretation as desired by
plaintiff would do violence to the letter, spirit, meaning, and
purpose of the statute.
Swvden 53 P.2d at 2885.
Similarly, the Rogozinski court ruled that only one refiling is allowed by the
Connecticut savings statute. "Here the fire occurred twelve years ago and this is the
fourth action started in state court to resolve the dispute. All of the previous dismissals
were due to some failure to act on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that this is
not the situation that [the savings statute] was intended to remedy." Rogozinski. 643
A.2d at 303, n. 9.
In Pintavalle v. Valkanos. 581 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut
Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute "would have
the effect of permitting a potentially limitless extension of the time to file succeeding

5

Although the facts in Swvden involved multiple refilings (three not including the
original) within the one year savings period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited
affirmatively to other cases where the first refilling occurred outside the original one
year savings period. Thus, it does not matter if the second or third refilings occurred
within or without the savings period because the statute allowed but one refilling.
20

actions. This would defeat the basic purpose of statutes of limitation, namely,
promoting finality in the litigation process. Although § 52-592 is a remedial statute and
must be construed liberally; it should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes
of limitation virtually meaningless." kL at 1052 (citations omitted).
If accepted, plaintiffs arguments here would essentially render the statute of
limitations meaningless. It should be noted that §78-12-40 is found within the heart of
the Limitation of Actions chapter of the Judicial Code. It therefore must be construed
and harmonized to work within the overall purpose of the act.
Plaintiff has exercised her one opportunity to file a lawsuit beyond the applicable
statute of limitations assuming § 78-12-40 applies. That filing was dismissed. Plaintiff
sought appellate review and obtained two opinions from both appellate courts of this
state denying her claims and upholding the dismissal. Since plaintiff is now on her third
refilling from which this appeal is taken, she has clearly exceeded the ambit of § 78-1240 and the trial court's ruling should be upheld.
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POINT III
Whether FSaintiff is allowed one or multiple refilings under § 78-12-40,
she nevertheless cannot name new parties who were not named in the
original complaint and who have no identity of interest to
the defendant named in her first complaint.
Plaintiff argues that her efforts to name the correct defendants in this action
should relate back to the first complaint which was filed within the applicable statute of
limitations. However, the law is clear that one may not add new parties to a lawsuit and
have that amendment relate back to the original filing for purposes of preserving the
statute of limitations.
At first blush, plaintiffs arguments appear to rely on Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This rule governs the relation back of amendments to pleadings and
allows a party to amend their existing pleadings and have them relate back to original
complaint or filing. However, plaintiff has not argued Rule 15(c) and rightly so. Case
law explicitly states that Rule 15(c) does not generally allow amendments to the
pleadings to include new parties since such amendments would amount to the
a .sertion of a new cause of action and defeat the very purpose of a statute of limitation.
Perry. 681 P.2dat218.
However, a narrow exception to this general rule allows new parties to be added
and related back to the original complaint where there is an identity of interest between
the old and new parties. \± at 217. Here, there is no identity of interest between
defendants who actually owned the property at the time of the accident and
22

"Willowcreek Plaza", a name on a building and the only named defendant
plaintiff's \.-o\ billing, "Willowcreek Plazn" is a nr- ^* nit
or hp sued. Furthermore, both tnis Cour

• - r. ^ sue
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plaintiff's prior assertions that the banks were doing business as W'illowcreek Plaza.
See Hebertson v. Willowcree Piazr-

-

*

- fcert, granted

at 910 P.2d 425). Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 >- :d •oiu vUtbh 1996).
! he L)u* .,.

< . _;^ ;...;:.^, .. i-M- * *
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s issue ° ~ ?opea? the

i Jtah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the second artirn
. f expressly rejected the plaintiff's claims that they were entitled to refile
their complaint under Utah Code Ann.
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or legal relationship" with the plaintiff in the first and timely filed lawsuit.
The appellants concede they sought no relief ar id in fact
were not parties to the prior action. They also concede they
have no legal relationship to the original plaintiff. . ., Absent
any identity or legal relationship between these appellants
and the plaintiff in the first suit, it is impossible for this Court
to apply § 78-12-40 to them. They simply had no interest in
the first suit and are now barred from litigating this case
because it is not timely asserted.
Dunn. 675 P.2d at '77?.
Admittedly, Dunn deals with a change in plaintiffs as parties However, the logic
of tl le Dunn o| >n m"n i .I louid

incorrect defendant who bears no

legal relationship to the ultimately proper defendant.
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Williams v. Zortman Mining. Inc.. 914 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1996) is also on point. In
Zortman. the plaintiff sued the parent company of a wholly owned subsidiary
corporation. Zortman actually was employed by the subsidiary and his claims of
discrimination in the workplace was in reality against his employer, not its parent
company. The federal court dismissed Zortman's claims for his attempt to "manipulate
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court." kL at 972. He thereafter sued the
subsidiary (his employer and the proper party) in state court after the statute of
limitations expired, j d .
Citing Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville. Inc.. 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991), the Zortman court stated : "We . . . .agree that the 'savings statute' does
not apply to save or 'renew' a complaint against a party not named in the original
complaint." \± at 973. Zortman goes on to agree with McCoy referenced elsewhere in
this brief that the second suit should be dismissed even if the proper corporate
defendant had actual notice of the first suit since the first suit failed to name it or a
company with whom it held a sufficient identity of interest and the statute of limitations
expired before the proper party was sued. I d
Plaintiff urges this Court to apply the equities of the identity of interest rule and
the general principle of fairness that cases ought to be heard on the merits, not
disposed of based on technical applications of the law to the facts at hand. While
defendants would agree with this principle as a general rule, such equities do not apply
to the requirements of naming the correct parties and satisfying the statute of
24

limitations.
Specifically, plaintiff cites the case of Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 253-54 (Utah
1988)forthe proposition that the Utah Suprnmn f:m ri M

iilm/wri ,i pi

iiiii in nhi i

"new defendant" to the second suit filed after the statute • • (imitation^ had run
However, a close ~'<~-*••

*

^ ., *. .x.

:

..

fh

9

naming of new parties under Rule 15(c) was never raised or addressed by the litigants
or tin-

IIIII

hi > 'iuu-'( | m.i in nil i •• itMuiences to Madsen for the proposition that the

Utah Supreme Court allowed the suit to proceed despite the fact that "o' v p.irtio1* WM» *
c ; .•;

.

XJ and misleading. Defendant is unaware of any case law or rules

which allow precedent to be established throi

• -

»r

discussed in opinions issued by the appellate courts of this state.
The equities refer*-

-

Co.. 656 P.2d 966 (Utah
d —

. matiis v. State Farm Ins.

- e likewise distinguishable. Plaintiff argues that the

'-

I

) lliiu instant action were done for mere form-

of-pleading errors.8 However, Williams did ilot address errors in such critica* - ^ s

See

- ' -1

|» 9

7

The plaintiff's first complaint against Commissioner Borthick in his official
capacity and the State of Utah was dismissed due to the plaintiff's failure to comply ^ iti i
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which requires budding litigants
wishing to sue the State to file a written notice of claim within one year of the incident
giving rise to their claims. Madsen v. Bothick. 658 P.2d 627, 633 (I Jtah 1983).
"6ee;

•

8
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as naming and suing the proper parties. Instead, Williams dealt with the proper
pleading of factual allegations associated with the affirmative defenses of fraud and
misrepresentation.9 IdL at 967. The court ruled that the defenses were sufficiently
plead to put plaintiff on notice of the same. Nowhere in Williams do the relaxed or
"liberalized pleading rules" extend to allow a plaintiff to pursue a lawsuit even though
they have sued a nor entity or named the wrong defendant.
The case of Jordan v. Commissioner > of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass.
1929), is illustrative of the point that the naming of the proper defendant is not a "formof-pleading" error.
However, plaintiff, cause of action and defendant cannot be
regarded as "form" within this definition. Misnomer or
misdescription of any of these substantive elements may be
"matter of form," but the mistaken choice of a defendant
unrelated to the subject-matter of the case is not merely a
formal error.
\_± at 654. Utah courts agree with this position. See. Perry. 681 P.2d at 217. Rule
15(c) does not allow the naming of new parties to relate back to the original filing
absent an identity of interest between the old and new parties. See also. Haro, 887
P.2d at 879, n.2. (Plaintiffs first suit was a nullity and plaintiff could not revive their
action after the statute of limitations period where the first suit was brought by a plaintiff
who lacked the capacity to sue.)

9

Williams sued State Farm Insurance Company to collect the face amount of a
life insurance policy. In its answer, State Farm alleged that the decedent
misrepresented his medical history on his application for the policy.
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While this case represents the improper naming ui a d^f- -

;

luro

-!" - : -^ify c*re on point and demonstrate that naming the proper party is critical to
maintaining an action and such errors is p i f ^ l i m ) camml In d i s n u ^ ' d ds «^»>»" >>•
excusable under the relaxed "form-of-pleading" rules,
Plaintiff's \w * nil fill \\ .icinih
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against an entity that did not exist and lacked the capacity to be sued. As such there is
r

, ^nt or addition of new parties could relate

back to sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations which ran shortly ntter plaintiff lil"d
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plaint and years before she finally named the proper defendants. While

plaintiff likely views these arguments as ir

t

vi ith Utah law and the purpose of statutes of limitation. See, Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d
572, 575 (Utah 1 9 " "
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relationship to the accident in question This utter failure o r ~.er D^t to properly iilitiate
her lawsuit whpn ^hc m

/
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• statute of

limitations expiration date is fatal to her claims and all other efforts including the
second, third and fourth complaints cannot revive an action that by law is a nullity and
was never filed in compliance with the statute of limitations in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff never complied with the statute of limitations in the first place insofar as
these defendants are concerned. Even if the savings statute applies to her first
dismissal she is entitled to only one refilling, not three. Finally, her efforts to correct her
mistake in naming the wrong defendants through amendment or relation back to her
original complaint are not proper. Utah law clearly prohibits her efforts to add new
parties in subsequent refilings.

Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs

complaint for statute of limitations purposes should be affirmed.
DATED this Z -

day of November, 1998.
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

JOHN CLYDE HANSEN
DANIEL L. STEELE

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of November, 1998 to the following:
Timothy C. Houpt
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Certified copies of Judge Lewis' ruling
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S RULING

RANDI HEBERTSON,

CASE NO. 920906515

Plaintiff/
vs.
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA,
Defendant.

A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and plaintiff's Motion to Amend, and the Request
for Hearing, the Court having reviewed the Motions, the Affidavits
in support and Reply Memorandum and the Memoranda in opposition,
and the Court being fully advised and finding good cause, rules as
stated herein.
The Court denies the Motion for Hearing.

The defendant's

Motion to Dismiss is granted for the reasons stated in defendant's
Memorandum, without prejudice.

This Motion having been granted,

this Court does not.address the Motion to Amend.
Dated this

.day of September, 1993
<<—•/„ /."V> «S
L E S L I E A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JTJDG

'$/%. -/mti&<i®o

HEBERTSON V. WILLOWCREEK

PAGE TWO

COURT'S RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct popy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this /

day of

September, 1993:

Ronald E. Dalby
Attorney for Plaintiff
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280
P.O. Box 17345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Brian S. King
Attorney for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
John Clyde Hansen
Attorney for Defendant
13 6 S. Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

g 1\*\(tfjwm

C©FY
John Clyde Hansen, No. 5286
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
136 South Main Street
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDI HEBERTSON,
|
;

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

|
;(

Civil No. 920906515
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

vs .
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA,

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having been decided by the Court
pursuant to Rule 4-501(3) (c), Utah Code Jud. Adm. , and the Court
having issued a written ruling dated September 1, 1993,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action b e , and the
same i s , dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

tfec^^of September, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing/TDRDER
OF DISMISSAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on September
/
,
1993, to the following:
Ronald E. Dalby
Matthew J. Storey
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280
P.O. Box 17345 (84117-0345)
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Brian S. King
KING & ISAACSON
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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TabB
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'n .
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s .-.•'•
Ronald E. Dalby (Bar No. 0807
Matthew J. Storey (Bar No. 4678)
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280
P.O. Box 17345 (84117-0345)
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone (801) 261-0088

BY
'-•^HK

Brian S. King (Bar No. 4610)
KING & ISAACSON
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone (801) 532-1700
Facsimile (801) 532-1780

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RANDI HEBERTSON,

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940900104

v.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, fka VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY, and THE DIME
SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK, FSB,
dba WILLOWCREEK PLAZA, WILLOW
CREEK SHOPPING VILLAGE, LTD.,
WILLOW CREEK PLAZA EXECUTIVE
OFFICES,
Defendant.

Plaintiff, through her undersigned counsel, gives notice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of the dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiffs actions
against Defendants.
DATED this _ £

day of February, 1994.
KING & ISAACSON

(l*

-

$• £l

Brian S. King
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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